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Abstract 
This article grew to look deeper into the relationship between different methodological tools in 
comparative law enquiries. There are several factors that currently affect these enquiries, such as 
the emergence of new spheres of normativity and transnational actors determining a new con-
figuration of the relationship between centre and periphery. Different forms and visions of legal 
pluralism could characterise a cultural tradition and different ways, in which existing nations, 
which have a pluralistic legal system, interact. Furthermore, one might add the consideration that 
the presence of different forms of pluralism—a pluralism of pluralisms—implies a constant and 
urgent need to reconsider the adequacy of the methodologies in comparative law. Hence, we can 
use different approaches because there are different purposes that the comparison pursues. Though 
the horizontal comparison is certainly a widespread tendency for comparative analyses, from a 
methodological point of view, we need to consider the importance of forms of vertical comparison, 
both a top-down and bottom-up approach. 
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1. Introduction 
At the beginning of a comparative enquiry, one of the main tasks for a researcher is the choice of methodologies. 
Friedrich Nietzsche, in his The Dawn of a Day, 1911 (Nietzsche, 1911), emphasised the concept according to 
which “There is no exclusive method of knowing in science. We must deal with things tentatively, treating them 
by turns harshly or justly, passionately or coldly. One investigator deals with things like a policeman, another 
like a confessor, and yet a third like an inquisitive traveller”. The relevance of Nietzsche’s words and their dy-
namic nature requires a legal scholar with comparative interests asking questions on methodology. He must take 
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into account the complexity of legal phenomena and the methodological tools also coming from other sciences 
(i.e. anthropology, sociology, political science, and neuroscience). Consequently, the debate regarding the suit-
ability of different methods has many and varied facets. It mainly depends on the legal tradition to which the 
scholar belongs, his/her legal education, the impact of the religious factors on his/her way of interpreting a 
transnational source of law. From this point of view, it is not surprising that there might be a sliding scale of 
methods while taking account of the central role played by the functional method for legal comparison. 
The aim of this paper is to show how the methodological tools used in comparative analyses are not com-
pletely suitable to study complex phenomena, and it is necessary to consider the integration of horizontal and 
vertical methodologies in legal comparison. There are several factors that currently affect these enquiries, such 
as the emergence of new spheres of normativity and transnational actors determining a new configuration of the 
relationship between centre and periphery. Furthermore, one might add the consideration that the presence of 
different forms of pluralism—a pluralism of pluralisms—implies a constant and urgent need to reconsider the 
adequacy of the methodologies in comparative law. In this regard, we believe that comparative law can play a 
crucial role in a global world.  
We shall start this reflection by the knowledge of our object of study, constructing a reading of materials 
(Frankemberg, 2006). Since the first approach, a comparative lawyer is alone (Merryman, 1999). He lives with 
“his epistemological prejudices, his attitude towards the absurd consequences of the theories that he accepts” 
(Feyerabend, 1978; Adams & Griffiths, 2012). According to Palmer, “method is now identified by the ‘tech-
niques’ by which comparisons are carried out. These techniques have thereby acquired the status of separate 
methods: thus we have historical, functional, evolutionary, structural, thematic, empirical and statistical com-
parisons, and all of these can be carried out from a micro or macro point of view.” Choosing a method is un-
doubtedly difficult (Palmer, 2005; Reimann, 2004). Annelise Riles brings out that a comparatist engages in 
comparison with the purpose “to find a model for modernization or to harmonize legal regimes” (Riles, 2001). 
Therefore, a comparatist needs to know the core of the methodological propositions and be in contact with 
other scholars also belonging to other epistemic communities. He bears in mind that this knowledge can have a 
significant impact on the results of his research (Gerber, 2011). Leaving aside other mundane objectives, fre-
quently characterized by decorative results—and, consequently, not very functional—a researcher knows that 
these results “reveal the skills, methods and talents of their markers; they allow us to distinguish the good, the 
bad and the temporary in means of production. A thing well-made will last [∙∙∙]” (Glenn, 2010). From this point 
of view, we regard similarities, between two or more legal systems, as coincidences or dissonances reveal the 
features of “cultural postures” of other legal systems. However, both perspectives can be helpful for a compara-
tist to simplify the study of foreign law. On one hand, it is, therefore, important to make into account the mac-
rocomparative studies, with the aim of identifying factors and variables that influence the transformation of legal 
systems (Zumbansen, 2012). Developments in technology have enabled rapid progress to facilitate this knowl-
edge. On the other hand, the knowledge of the language and the cultural and social factors characterising a legal 
system may allow revealing, “An experience without theory is just as incomprehensible as is (allegedly) a theory 
without experience”. “Eliminate part of the theoretical knowledge of a sensing subject and you have a person 
who is completely disoriented and incapable of carrying out the simplest action.” None of these factors can be 
separated from the passion which “gives rise to specific behaviour which in turn creates the circumstances and 
the ideas necessary for analysing and explaining the process, for making it ‘rational’” (Feyerabend, 1978). 
The structure of this article is simple. After a concise introduction to the methodological tools for studying 
complex phenomena (1), I discuss the concept of pluralistic methodology (2) and the choice of developing ver-
tical methodology for comparative law (3). 
2. Methodological Pluralism and Legal Comparison 
From an epistemological point of view, the introductory questions can certainly be useful for a reflection on 
comparative methodology. A comparatist always searches for the best solution analyzing legal problems inter-
related with religious pluralism. It “is an exercise that is no doubt valuable, but it is not really any more com-
parative in its methodological sophistication than legal reasoning in general” (Samuel, 2011). Feyerabend has 
rightly noted that “who wishes to maximize the empirical contents of the view he holds and who wants to un-
derstand them as clearly as he possibly can must therefore introduce other views; that is, he must adopt a plural-
istic methodology” (Feyerabend, 1978). The first element, which we can here take into account, concerns the 
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spread of tools that enable us to learn faster about “other” cultures and the relations between different legal and 
cultural traditions. In the ancient world, this circulation of information or models probably had no formal meth-
odology; we can found it in the common chthonic origins, which would still have had culture-specific character-
istics. 
The progressive development of other forms of communication and the collection of information on the 
World Wide Web today reach and transform the comparatists. They are no longer the travellers described by 
Tocqueville, but could become “virtual comparatists” and acquire sources of inspiration and information from 
the Web. How and with what results? Moreover, to what extent are there language barriers? On the Web, there 
is not a global language, but many. On the one hand, the growing wealth of available materials is a valuable aid 
to set up a comparative research, including a diachronic point of view. On the other hand—according to McLu-
han—, this implementation means, “‘the message’ of any medium or technology is the change of scale or pace 
or pattern that it introduces into human affairs. Earlier, the railway did not introduce movement or transportation 
or wheel or road into human society, but it accelerated and enlarged the scale of previous human functions, cre-
ating totally new kinds of cities and new kinds of work or leisure” (McLuhan, 1994). This view undoubtedly 
expresses the need to study different legal systems, rather than just what belongs to the legal and cultural tradi-
tions of civil law or common law. One could observe that a type of law requires X method; B law requires Y 
method and C law requires Z method. According to Husa, “this kind of methodological mentality does not take 
into account legal pluralism in the true sense” (Husa, 2011).  
By “legal pluralism” Griffiths refers to “the presence of a social field of more than one legal order” (Griffiths, 
1986). Different forms and visions of legal pluralism could characterise a cultural tradition and different ways in 
which existing nations with a pluralistic legal system. For instance, some countries could accept that ethnic or 
religious communities may operate their rule systems with official legal effects on family law. “Marriage, di-
vorce inheritance and other matters dealing with personal status may be regulated by the rules of that particular 
community on the basis of the sanction of the state” (Edge, 2013). However, they may also be oblivious of, or 
consciously seek to counteract state sanction. In the United Kingdom, e.g. “Muslims are relating to something 
more than the norms of the English legal system alone. Issues then arise over how the different systems of 
norms interact and might coexist.” From this point of view, we could have at least two forms of legal pluralism: 
“where, within a state, enclaves with separate legal rules may operate; and legal systems which sanction or en-
force different systems of legal rules in state-wide but separate and parallel court systems” (Edge, 2013). The 
coexistence of different sources of law represents a significant problem for the lawyer accustomed to the princi-
ple of hierarchy coined within the constitutional law of national states. This problem does not only concern the 
issue of legal pluralism, but also that of globalization that can create uniformity in some places and integration 
in others (Riles, 2006). Legal rules such as, e.g. statutes, acts, cases, customs can coexist and circulate in the 
global arena. It is normal to wonder what happens in cases of collision between different norms that the courts 
could apply to the case at hand. It is evident that a key element, in such debates and processes, is the power to 
determine what the law is and what is not, or what is legal and what something else is. All these processes of 
globalization or regionalization—such as the process of Europeanisation—“are challenging the mechanical un-
derstanding of methodology” (Husa, 2011), as well as the coercive and unifying roles of legal centralism. By the 
way, if the role of the state is necessary to allow the entry of rules coming from other geographical areas, there 
are mechanisms by which the opposite could happen. For example, the rules and norms of Muslim communities 
in England could form a new system of law (called angrezishari’at) (Menski, 2014). Muslims living in the UK 
transmit the requirements of English law into the Islamic law. 
The creation of a system of sources not deriving from legal centralism is the product of conceptions that con-
sider legal pluralism as a fact. From this last point of view, “what are the consequences for the methodology of 
legal research […]? And, if there is no legal centralism, but pluralism what method(s) should one deploy? (Husa, 
2011). This question clearly relates to the methodology of comparative law. It is difficult, for example, to imag-
ine a comparative analysis of the sources of law in a global space crossing the borders of states, without an ap-
propriate methodological choice. According to Adams and Griffiths, “there is no single comparative method 
because there is no single question” if you compare domestic and foreign law. The method will mostly vary, 
from formalism (“law in the books”) through legal realism (“law in practice”) to various sorts of functional 
comparison (Adams & Griffiths, 2012). Furthermore, the presence of different forms of pluralism—a pluralism 
of pluralisms—implies a constant and urgent need to reconsider the adequacy of the methodological tools have 
been used up to now by comparative lawyers. 
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3. Globalization, Legal Pluralism and Vertical Comparison 
The opinion of some comparative lawyers on legal pluralism has led to the conclusion that “legal pluralism is a 
limited, exceptional and disappearing phenomenon” (Griffiths, 1986). According to Michaels, “the irreducible 
plurality of legal orders in the world, the coexistence of domestic state law with other legal orders, the absence 
of a hierarchically superior position transcending the differences, all of these topics of legal pluralism reappear 
on the global sphere” (Michaels, 2009). All legal systems, Western or non-Western, are plural and then it is 
necessary to consider legal pluralism as a global phenomenon. Why are comparative law and its methodologies 
useful, with respect to different forms of pluralism? From a global point of view, there are new factors in com-
parative studies, such as the emergence of new spheres of normativity, private powers and transnational actors in 
an international arena, a new configuration of political relations, and a criticism of the Western view of the rela-
tionship between centre and periphery. To this element—defined “impact” or “enmeshment between the global 
and the local”, it is necessary to add those of extensity, intensity and velocity, as traits of globalisation (Michaels, 
2013), opening up new frontiers in comparative law scholarship (Auby, 2010).  
The processes of globalisation are something more than the simple expansion of Western influence that comes 
across local and particular forms of resistance. We cannot simplify the complexity of this phenomenon into a 
dichotomous opposition. As Glenn notes, “each tradition, or at least each of the major ones, has within it the po-
tential to globalize, to be used for purposes of domination in a way which suppresses, by manifold means, vari-
ant opinion” (Glenn, 2010). With reference to the three main actors of globalisation—the West, Islam and East 
Asia, it is not possible to predict the development of this competition. However, might one believe that com-
parative law can help in the creation of a common ground, a common zone of impact; an intersection set where 
to address the comparative analysis? In which set do different actors play their roles by using different proce-
dures?  
In order to outline new directions in comparative law, we could say that legal comparison is mainly horizontal. 
Legal scholars are used to compare legal systems or institutions belonging to the same level, both national (e.g. 
for comparative constitutional law) and international level (e.g. comparing international institutions) (Momirov 
& Naudé Fourie, 2009). Many of these scholars are today devoted to the study of global law, highlighting the 
need to use the comparative method, and this does not necessarily mean that they have to consider only a hori-
zontal form of legal comparison. This way could ignore the existence of legal transplants, as well as a develop-
ment of principles and rights in a global space. An imposition of global rules at the national level or the adoption 
in a global sphere of principles and values of a domestic legal system oblige legal scholars to rethink the use of 
comparative methodology. 
However, we can shift our focus from horizontal to vertical methodology in comparative law. For “vertical 
comparison”, I mean not only the analysis of successive forms of the same legal system, but also the comparison 
between systems, or legal institutions, do not belong to the same level. We will talk about this second perspec-
tive. From this point of view, comparative methodology can be vertical top-down or bottom-up. In the first case, 
we can use this mode of legal comparison “e.g. typically in the context of the internalization of international 
norms and regulations by national legal orders, whereby national law is required to incorporate international 
concepts into the national legal system” (Momirov & Naudé Fourie, 2009). In the second case, we can use ver-
tical, bottom-up, legal comparison, analyzing “the transposition of legal concepts, or the ideas behind them, 
from national to international level” (Momirov & Naudé Fourie, 2009). For example, in constitutional law, the 
comparison is horizontal when one might take into account national legal systems (or their legal formants) or 
even national systems in relationship with supranational legal systems. In terms of vertical comparison, there is 
a further approach used in cases in which international standards incorporate national principles (Rosenblum, 
2007; Chodosh, 1999). 
Some analytical studies on vertical comparative methodology are in the field of administrative law. A starting 
point for analysing this issue could be the paper by Felix Frankfurter, published in 1927 in the University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, and entitled “The Task of Administrative Law”. When analysing the relationship 
between judicial review and administrative law, he notes that: “therefore, a subject like “judicial review”, in any 
scientific development of administrative law, must be studied not only horizontally, but vertically, e.g., “judicial 
review” of Federal Commission orders, “judicial review” of postal fraud orders, “judicial review” of deportation 
warrants. For judicial review in postal cases, for instance, is coloured by the whole structure of which it forms a 
part, just as in land office cases, or in immigration causes or in utility valuations or in insurance license revoca-
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tions, it derives significance from the nature of the subject matter under review as well as from the agency which 
is reviewed” (Frankfurter, 1926).  
However, in the comparative process one might have to use different methodologies according to the function 
that one intends to carry through the comparison. The methods of comparative law have developed over time 
and comparatists are always in search of something new (Chodosh, 1999). This is also justified by the fact that 
there are different categories of people who make use of comparative law: scholars or academic comparatists, 
legislative or reform comparatists and law-applying comparatists (Palmer, 2005). They can use different meth-
odologies because there are different purposes that the comparison pursues. Although the horizontal comparison 
is certainly more widespread, we will only consider forms of vertical comparison and, in particular, a top-down 
and a bottom-up approach. The former regards the mobility of legal concepts from national to international lev-
els and vice-versa.  
The reasons, we rethink the use of the comparative methodology, and, particularly, developing a cross-eche- 
lon comparison, are different. We will shortly describe two. 
First, before the 90s, we use legal comparison and transpositions of legal concepts, from one legal system into 
another, by “horizontal” methodology. However, in the following years, transnational interactions, global com-
merce, a rapid development of web communication, such as the global economic crisis, have led to greater- 
complexity in the analysis of legal phenomena. Consequently, this complexity had impact on the way to make 
legal comparison and circulation and integration of legal rules and models. In this regard, Gutteridge noted that 
“any relationship or kinship between comparative law and the law of nations must, therefore, be of a shadowy 
nature, and the only possible link between the two disciplines is to be found in the extent to which the compara-
tive study of private law can be regarded as an instrument to be employed in promoting the growth and devel-
opment of the law of nations” (Gutteridge, 1946). We could consider that “the integration rules can present a 
high degree of complexity, mainly from the institution of new procedures that allow producing these rules. In 
any case, it does not propose changes on the closing of the system” (Pfersmann, 2001). This setting of the prob-
lem does not however help to analyze all those cases in which the mobility and the transplantation of legal con-
cepts occur in different forms, and sometimes in a tacit form.  
Second, vertical comparison could contribute to the development of a common zone of impact. By “im-
pact”—or “enmeshment between the global and the local”—we mean that “local events can have global conse-
quences, and that on the other hand global developments materialize locally” (Michaels, 2013). The concept of 
intersection of sets can help clarify this. Let us take into consideration two sets: e.g. two actors in a global arena, 
denoted A and B. For example, we consider Germany (state actor) (A) and World Bank (non-state actor) (B), 
e.g., with different economic procedural rules: those of country A {r, r1, r2, ∙∙∙, rn} (which belong to set A), and 
those of institution B {x, x1, x2, ∙∙∙, xn} (which belong to set B). Suppose that “a) r, r1, r2, ∙∙∙, rn ∈ A; b) r, r1, r2, ∙∙∙, 
rn ∉ B; c) x, x1, x2, ∙∙∙, xn ∈ σ B; d) x, x₁, x2, ∙∙∙, xn ∉ A”. It is possible to identify one or more element in the two 
sets (e.g., a rule, a procedure, or a legal formant, common to both sets), which could form part of an intersection 
between the two sets (I = A ∩ B), and may contain other elements common to A and B. We can see this concept 
by Venn diagrams that enable the students to see the relationships between two or three sets. They can then 
identify similarities and differences.  
The intersection of different sets graphically could represent a common zone of impact in a global space. 
From this point of view, bottom-up comparative law method—but the same we say for top-down—could be 
necessary for developing this set. In this case, according to Gerber, we can show that “a comparative approach 
grounded in functionalism only tends to focus on the substantive aspects of law, while new comparative objec-
tives also require an emphasis on e.g. procedural elements (Gerber, 1998)” and flexibility to construct a concep-
tual model. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
This short article follows the idea, perceived by many legal scholars that legal pluralism and the effects of glob-
alization have required a different approach with the comparative methodology. According to Husa, “if there is 
no legal centralism but pluralism what method(s) should one deploy?” (Husa, 2011). Comparison needs a plu-
rality of lenses and more and more new focuses, which can combine the dynamic profiles of legal traditions with 
the transition from the traditional study of nation-states to that of epistemic communities. These communities 
can be characterised by people belonging to different cultural and normative traditions. However, it is possible 
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to find elements in common, which tie together these traditions and represent, on one hand, a common heritage 
of values and, on the other hand, their differences. The fact is that through a functional approach—or a neo- 
functional perspective—it seems possible to identify these common elements even if belonging to different legal 
traditions: a common ground of traditions. In particular, this paper wants to indicate, however briefly, that the 
methodological tools used in comparative analyses are not completely suitable to study complex phenomena. 
We need to consider the integration between horizontal and vertical methodologies in legal comparison, and, 
above all, that many legal scholars compared legal systems or institutions belonging to the same level, both na-
tional (e.g. for comparative constitutional law) and international level. For “vertical comparison”, I mean not 
only the analysis of successive forms of the same legal system, but also the comparison between systems, or le-
gal institutions, do not belong to the same level. This mode of comparison can be vertical top-down or bot-
tom-up. 
Vertical comparative methodology could have an impact on comparative process. Momirov and Naudé Fourie 
divide it in four stages: a) formulation of hypothesis based on observation of prima facie similarities; b) con-
struction and verification of conceptual model—tertiumcomparationis for vertical comparison—through hori-
zontal comparison; c) conduction of vertical comparison (similarities and differences); d) synthesis (hypothesis 
proved/disproved, conclusions) (Momirov & Naudé Fourie, 2009). 
By way of summary, we indicate that vertical comparison could contribute to the development of a common 
zone of impact. It means that local events could have global consequences, and vice-versa. Two different legal 
orders, analysed from a horizontal or vertical point of view, appear as a binary order, in which differences coex-
ist with a set of common principles. A peaceful coexistence should substantially exclude the rigid positions of 
legal centralism and the idea of a state monopoly of the production of valid norms. However, a comparatist 
should get used to consider that legal mind should be more multivalent than bivalent, beyond a binary opposi-
tion. Although the constitutions contain the principle of the hierarchy of sources of law and the mechanisms for 
resolving conflicts between legal norms, it may happen that a regional or global rule could interfere with these 
predictions. From a comparative law point of view, the fields, in which this conflict can happen theoretically, are 
many. Constitutional values, jurisdiction, family law, criminal law, and public space of individual religious 
freedom, are fields of application of a cross-echelon mode of comparison. This does not exclude, however, that 
one or more legal systems may not contain (or only marginally contain) common elements: sets have different 
characteristics, as opposed to the well-known classification schemes. If one imagines multiplying sets by trans-
ferring it to a black and white image, the negative could become a difference map in which the law in dissocia-
tion from the state could be visible. 
According to Husa with reference to a normative pluralism, “polynomia necessarily means competence be-
tween various norms-producers: national, international, European, transnational, local regional, indigenous, 
business-based and so on. To write “method” with a lower case and to reject legal centralism leads doing the 
same to legislator(s) even while some of the ramifications may be harmful from the point of view of democracy 
as it has been understood in western constitutional law (Husa, 2011)”. Reflecting on global justice, Garcia in-
troduces the concept of “Global Basic Package”, containing a set of political, social and economic rights, guar-
anteed by a global law. Global institutions, supranational actors and national states, both public and private in-
stitutions, would give life to this common zone of impact (Garcia, 2013). However, in the absence of significant 
changes of methodology, comparative law is not fully able to cope with the impact of globalisation on local le-
gal traditions and develop a common global heritage.  
To conclude, it is crucial to see that methodology, or methodologies, in comparative law, can help us to locate 
this middle ground, “a place: between cultures and peoples, between empires and the world of villages without- 
state, [...] where different peoples recompose their differences” (White, 1991; Melissaris, 2009). A comparative 
analysis, which takes place in this direction, highlights more and more cosmopolitan character, as well as the 
need to test the validity of the methods of comparative law in action within a global point of view. 
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